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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the themes of this conference is that we, as lawyers,
judges, educators, and concerned citizens, need to take a hard look at
institutional responses to perceived problems with lawyers' conduct,
such as incivility, abusive practices, greed; the poor public image of
lawyers; neglect of distributive justice and access issues; and so on. As
it stands, we are not sure what is working among the diverse responses
that have been implemented, and what is likely to work among the
multifarious proposals to enhance the accountability of lawyers for
misbehavior. Although we lack much empirical data, one consistent
intuition of the legal profession critics is that legal regulatory
institutions, such as courts and state bar associations, are not well-
positioned to play a leading role in reform. Judges dislike being
bogged down in satellite litigation over sanctions motions and are
rightly suspicious of the tactical misuse of procedural rules, such as
Rule 11 and the discovery-abuse provisions, designed to curb the
excesses of partisan advocacy. State bar investigatory personnel and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
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grievance committees are woefully underfunded and must concentrate
their limited resources on egregious wrongdoing such as embezzling
client funds. Legislatures and administrative agencies are thought to
be subject to capture by the industry they regulate-here, the legal
profession-although a sufficiently urgent need for reform may
prompt changes in the law, as the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley statute
and the accompanying SEC regulations show.' In general, though,
there appears to be a persistent sense that legal institutions are not
doing a very good job and may not be expected to perform well at
responding to the need for reform.
This apparent fecklessness in formal regulatory responses has
resulted in a great deal of pressure on the concept of professionalism
as an aspiration.2 Reformers urge law schools to do a better job at
inculcating the appropriate attitudes or dispositions in their students.
Some local bar associations adopt "creeds" of professionalism and
oaths to administer to lawyers, and bar leaders, judges, and academics
issue an endless stream of articles aimed at winning the hearts and
minds of lawyers. The premise of this sort of response is that
professionalism represents more than a bare minimum of compliance
with rules. Rather, lawyers should be guided by ideals that may not be
susceptible to being embodied in enforceable disciplinary codes.3
There is a deep irony, then, to the call for enhancing the"accountability" of lawyers for falling short by this measure of
professionalism. If the quality in question is an aspiration and not a
minimum, then by definition lawyers cannot fail to attain it. We may
urge lawyers on toward greater heights of professionalism, but it is a
contradiction to speak of holding lawyers accountable for failing to do
something that is, after all, supposed to be above and beyond a "mere"
duty.
The calls for enhancing accountability suggest that reformers are
less interested in professionalism as an aspiration than professionalism
as a concept that is equivalent to normatively appropriate regulation of
1. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
2. See e.g., CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, How CAN PRO-
FESSIONALISM BE INSTITUTIONALIZED? THE GEORGIA EXPERIENCE 8-13 (2002),
available at http://www.garbar.org/cjcpcreed.asp#creed [hereinafter GA. COMM'N
REP.] (presenting an Aspirational Statement on Professionalism). I will cite to the
bound printed version.
3. See id. at 55. The report distinguishes "ethics," a minimum standard of be-
havior established by state bar disciplinary rules and other norms embodied in the law
governing lawyers, and "professionalism," which it understands as consisting primarily
of aspirational standards which are nevertheless "expected" of lawyers. Id. In
philosophical terms, professionalism consists of those actions that are
supererogatory-that is, morally praiseworthy but not required by a moral obligation.
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lawyers' activities. In other words, the fundamental question of
professionalism is where the line should be located between
permissible and prohibited conduct. I will have more to say about this
theme in a post-conference reflections essay.4 For the purposes of this
constructive proposal, let us assume that we have reached some
consensus on how the line should be drawn. Suppose we have
concluded that lawyers in civil litigation should be deterred from
conduct such as filing motions with quick turnaround times solely to
harass opposing counsel, who is known to have a scheduling conflict;
refusing to stipulate to facts that are not in serious dispute;
grandstanding and posturing in depositions; being unfairly evasive in
response to legitimate discovery requests; or using procedural devices
solely for the purpose of delay. There are similar lines to be drawn in
transactional and criminal litigation matters, but the point is first to
clarify what constitutes unprofessional behavior.
If we are relatively clear on the boundary between appropriate and
inappropriate conduct, the natural follow-up question is how best to
calibrate a regime of sanctions to deter wrongful actions without over-
deterring or creating a chilling effect on legitimate activities, such as
vigorous advocacy in support of a client with a just, but legally
disfavored, position. One possibility is to rely on legal sanctions,
imposed either by the profession itself, through the organized bar's
grievance and disciplinary process, or by courts, legislatures, or
administrative agencies. As mentioned previously, legal sanctions have
some of the following well-known structural flaws: in order to satisfy
due process concerns, they must be based on articulated rules, which
may be over-inclusive or under-inclusive with respect to the harm that
the rules seek to prevent; it is difficult to specify in advance all the
circumstances in which sanctions would be appropriate; the rules on
which the sanctions are based are subject to manipulation or "gaming"
by adversaries; legal sanctions can be expensive and time-consuming
to invoke, so that an aggrieved individual may decide that the cost of
obtaining relief exceeds the benefit provided by the remedy; and from
the standpoint of the legal institution that imposes the sanction,
providing relief may create substantial administrative burdens.
As it turns out, formal legal sanctions are not the only method of
professional self-regulation employed by lawyers. A great deal of
unethical conduct is actually controlled by informal, nonlegal
sanctions-penalties imposed by lawyers on each other, acting outside
4. W. Bradley Wendel, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Lawyer-
Bashing: Some Post-Conference Reflections, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1027 (2003).
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the scope of official legal processes.' The key to the functioning of
nonlegal sanctions mechanisms is the value of a lawyer's reputation.
Unless a lawyer is a one-shot player with respect to other lawyers and
courts, she cares very much about acquiring a reputation for
cooperativeness, trustworthiness, and reasonableness. A repeat-player
lawyer with a contrary reputation faces numerous costly obstacles,
such as the refusal by other lawyers to agree to reasonable schedule
changes, the need to memorialize every agreement in writing, and
difficulty making credible commitments. In litigation contexts,judges
may give less credence to a representation made by a lawyer who is
known to be untrustworthy. In transactional work, parties to a deal
may demand more expensive and time-consuming due-diligence
procedures when entering into a transaction with a party represented
by a lawyer who has a poor reputation. Many lawyers also depend on
referrals of business from other lawyers, and someone with a bad
reputation would be disadvantaged if other lawyers stopped sending
clients to her. Thus, for purely self-interested reasons, a repeat-player
lawyer has incentives to follow the community's prevailing norms of
ethics and etiquette.6
Two recent articles in the ABA Journal provide some anecdotal
evidence for these claims. The subjects of the articles are lawyers who
practice in Charleston, South Carolina,7 and in municipal courts in
Chicago.8 Although the settings seem different-a medium-sized,
relatively homogeneous city in the South and a much larger and more
diverse city in the Upper Midwest-the lawyers profiled in the articles
share the quality of being repeat players with respect to each other and
5. 1 have written about this subject at greater length in W. Bradley Wendel,
Busting the Professional Trust: Comment on William Simon's Ladd Lecture, 30 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the
Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1955 (2001); and W. Bradley Wendel, Regulation of Lawyers Without the Code, the
Rules, or the Restatement: Or, What Do Honor and Shame Have to do with Civil
Discovery Practice?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
6. The terminology of one-shot and repeat-player is drawn from the well-known
article by Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97 (1974). Similar terms are used
in game theory to capture the idea that a player's strategic situation is different if he
anticipates future interactions with the same player-it might be rational to defect in
a game played only once, because the opponent would not have a chance to retaliate,
but it might be rational to cooperate in a repeated game, because of the desire to avoid
retaliation by the opponent in a subsequent round. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD
ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 159-87 (1994) (applying the game theory and
associated behavior to the law).
7. Margaret Graham Tebo, Law in the Low Country, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2001, at 40.
8. Stephanie Francis Cahill, Motion Warriors, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2002, at 28.
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the judges before whom they practice. Lawyers in Charleston
generally know each other personally, which is not surprising given
the size of the legal community,9 while in Chicago municipal courts,
the lawyers "all seem to know one another and those who staff the
courthouses."'" Even in a large city, lawyers with specialized practices,
such as the Chicago lawyers who handle only drunk-driving or
eviction cases, can form subcommunities which serve as information-
sharing mechanisms among lawyers, judges, and courthouse
personnel. Both sets of lawyers are geographically concentrated-the
Charleston lawyers are near the county courthouse and the intersection
of Broad and Meeting Streets, where a number of lawyers have their
offices," and the Chicago lawyers are in the Richard J. Daley civil
courts building or in the criminal division courthouse. 2 The lawyers
gossip among themselves and share information about which other
lawyers can be trusted.
As a result of the relatively small number of lawyers in the
relevant subcommunities, physical proximity to one another, and
repeat dealings among counsel, these groups of lawyers are able to
exercise effective control over unprofessional conduct, without
resorting to formal legal mechanisms. Although there may be some
need for enhanced judicial enforcement of existing rules against
deception, for example, 3 in geographically concentrated, relatively
small communities of lawyers, there are already enforcement
mechanisms that ensure that a lawyer's word is her bond. In Robert
Putnam's terms, repeated interactions among the lawyers build up a
stock of "social capital,"' 4 which facilitates cooperation and fairness
in what would otherwise be an amoral marketplace. Social capital can
be specific to two interacting parties, or it can be generalized, so that
norms of cooperativeness and honesty are diffused throughout the
entire community.' 5 A community characterized by this kind of
generalized expectation of good behavior is one whose members
deserve the label "professionals."
9. Tebo, supra note 7, at 42.
10. Cahill, supra note 8, at 28.
11. Tebo, supra note 7, at 40.
12. Cahill, supra note 8, at 28.
13. W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American Lawyers:
Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. REV. 527, 535-
36 (2002).
14. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
15. Id. at 21-22.
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II. NONLEGAL REGULATION IN PRACTICE
I am interested in the process by which communities enhance
social capital by using decentralized mechanisms, outside the control
of legal institutions, to control undesirable behavior. Although the
ABA Journal articles do not specifically mention sociological concepts
like social capital, or economic concepts like gatekeepers and
reputational intermediaries, the stories they relate are evidence for the
effectiveness of control mechanisms that rely on reputation, trust, and
reciprocity. Some common themes emerge from the description of the
bars in Charleston and Chicago.
A. Credibility Is a Valuable Asset
In the fast-moving world of small-time civil trial practice in
Chicago, there is not enough time to litigate motions on a full record,
so lawyers make representations to judges about the facts of the case.
One lawyer who represents landlords in eviction cases notes that he
needs the trust of the court in order to be effective:
If the client says he fixed some [housing code]
violations and he didn't, I get rid of the client. I don't
need that .... When I tell the judge the repairs are
done, I have to believe it, and the judge has to
believe me. All you've got is your credibility. 6
Presumably, a lawyer who loses this credibility will be
unsuccessful at persuading a judge to grant relief, at least not without
a much more extensive record. In this vein, a retired judge in
Charleston reports that "he would sign any motion a lawyer brought
to him. But ... if he ever got into trouble for signing something, he
would never sign anything for that lawyer again."' 7 A lawyer with a
reputation for trustworthiness practicing before this judge would have
a valuable asset-credibility that enables the lawyer to get orders
signed quickly, without going through costly formal procedures; on the
contrary, a lawyer who lost that credibility would be disadvantaged
relative to more trustworthy lawyers, because she would have to resort
to cumbersome motion procedures to get the judge to sign orders.
Therefore, lawyers serve as reputational intermediaries or
"gatekeepers," vouching for the credibility of their clients' positions
16. Cahill, supra note 8, at 31 (internal alterations omitted).
17. Tebo, supra note 7, at 79.
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so that third parties and courts are not required to take redundant
precautions to ensure against being cheated. 8 In theory, a lawyer has
an interest in preserving her reputation for probity and would be
unwilling to squander this valuable asset to help one unscrupulous
client, as the short-term gain from that single representation would be
outweighed by the long-term reputational loss.
Lawyers sometimes assert that there is no upside to being ethical,
professional, civil, or trustworthy. Unethical behavior is unlikely to be
detected and punished, so the risk of behaving unethically is low, in
terms of legal sanctions. At the same time, the cost of conforming
one's conduct to professional norms is high because clients are
allegedly seeking "attack dog" lawyers. 9 However, the vignettes of
lawyers in repeat-player communities belie these claims. Uninformed
clients may seek attack dog lawyers, but it would be an unwise
strategy. Attack dogs enjoy less flexibility and presumptive credibility
from adversaries and judges, leading to increased expenses associated
with complying with formal procedures. Therefore, lawyers who are
known to be trustworthy and cooperative have something valuable to
sell to clients-the reduction of transaction costs associated with using
less costly informal procedures, which depend on the parties'
cooperation, instead of more elaborate formal procedures in which
breaches are punished by judicially enforced sanctions.
B. Small, Concentrated Communities Facilitate Inexpensive
Sharing of Inform ation
As sociologist Robert Putnam notes, cultivating social capital and
trust in a complex society requires a network of social ties, which in
turn facilitates gossip and information-sharing. 0 Lawyers who know
each other and talk frequently can communicate information about
others' tendencies either to cooperate with opposing lawyers or to
18. See e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs
of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) (discussing the concept of gatekeepers in
corporate transactions).
19. Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institu-
tional, Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable,
Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773,
778, 792 (1998).
20. PUTNAM, supra note 14, at 21. Similarly, Lisa Bernstein observed that "geo-
graphical concentration, ethnic homogeneity, and repeat dealing may be necessary
preconditions to the emergence of a contractual regime based on reputation bonds."
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 140 (1992).
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defect from cooperative arrangements.2" Although one frequently
encounters observations about how large and impersonal the
community of practicing lawyers has become, there are ways to
facilitate social ties even within large professional communities. The
Charleston Bar maintains genteel traditions such as monthly lunches
organized by a senior member of the community, at which the lawyers
swap stories and pass along local traditions.22 But even in the much
larger market of Chicago, lawyers spend a lot of time chatting with
other lawyers or courthouse personnel between appearances.23 Even
the bar in a large metropolitan community can be personalized to some
extent if it is divided into specialized subcommunities, like the
landlord-tenant lawyers described in the ABA Journal article.24 Within
these subcommunities, information-sharing mechanisms like lunches
and hallway "chit-chat" can flourish.
Still, there are limits to how large and diffuse a community can
become before informal information-sharing mechanisms break down.
Lawyers whose practices are national in scope may not have effective
means of ascertaining the reputations of local practitioners and judges
in all the communities in which they practice. (The same informational
asymmetry affects the local lawyers as well, who cannot easily find out
whether the new lawyer on the scene is trustworthy.) One
underappreciated argument against relaxing restraints on multi-
jurisdictional practice is that it tends to weaken informal controls on
lawyers' behavior. To the extent the practice of law is strongly
localized, unethical behavior by lawyers can be addressed by nonlegal
sanctions, such as information-sharing among the community of
lawyers, and the subsequent imposition of costs by other members of
the community. As the practice of law becomes increasingly national,
and lawyers are increasingly one-shot players with respect to one
another and courts, these sanctions lose their effectiveness and the
21. See WALTER BENNETT, THE LAWYER'S MYTH: REVIVING IDEALS IN THE LE-
GAL PROFESSION 79-80 (2001) (presenting stories by lawyers recounting when the bar
in large cities was much smaller, and lawyers knew something about each other).
22. Tebo, supra note 7, at 43. The Georgia Chief Justice's Commission on Pro-
fessionalism recommends instituting "programs to honor colleagues adhering to high
professional standards," informal local professionalism committees, CLE's, and
mentoring programs, all of which would have the function of promulgating didactic
stories about the ethics of local lawyers. See GA. COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 25-
26, 15-20. The report notes that "[b]uilding a community among the lawyers of this
state is a specific goal" of the requirement that all lawyers attend one hour per year of
professionalism CLE. Id. at 26.
23. Cahill, supra note 8, at 31-32.
24. Id.
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profession is left with more costly legal remedies as the only response
to perceived unethical conduct.
2
There are ways that the information-sharing function of
communities can be strengthened, even as they grow larger in scope.
One of the most effective is to encourage the development of an active
trade press, reporting in detail on what lawyers do. In the notorious
Fisons Corporation discovery-abuse case,26 the law firm was probably
damaged more by an article in the American Lawyer entitled Sleazy in
Seattle27 than by the court-imposed sanctions. In addition, judges
should be more aware of the importance of reputation and should
identify unethical conduct in opinions, particularly if it is one factor in
the court's decision. In a story from an Oklahoma trial court that I
frequently cite, a lawyer breached an oral promise to modify a
discovery schedule, and when he realized that he could create trouble
for his adversary, he insisted on holding to the written schedule. The
other lawyer made a motion to modify the schedule, which was denied
because of a local rule providing that any schedule changes had to be
in writing. However, at the conclusion of the motion hearing, the judge
asked the prevailing lawyer to turn and face the courtroom, which was
crowded with other lawyers waiting to argue motions. After the bailiff
obtained the crowd's attention, the judge announced,
"I just want everyone to know how Mr. X practices
law. He orally agreed to postpone certain discovery
matters, but now is before this court arguing that his
word is not enforceable because the agreement
wasn't in writing as required by the local court rules.
Take a good look at him now so you will know who
you are dealing with in the future.
2
25. A leitmotiv of the conference was the sanctions proceeding against Texas
attorney Joe Jamail for engaging in name-calling in a deposition. See Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). Because Jamail
had been admitted pro hac vice, the Delaware Supreme Court could not effectively
sanction him, id. at 56, particularly because he noted, "I'd rather have a nose on my ass
than go to Delaware for any reason." STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 499 (6th ed. 2002). If legal regulations cannot affect
the behavior of out-of-state lawyers, it is unlikely that any community-based sanctions
could deter Jamail's conduct.
26. Described in DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN TH4E INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 86-88 (2000).
27. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Sleazy in Seattle, AM. LAW.-, Apr. 1994, available at
http://www.law.com.
28. ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & TERESA S. COLLETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE RULES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 188-89 (1996).
9
Wendel: Informal Methods of Enhancing the Accountability Lawyers
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54: 967
Finally, judges should take opportunities to remind lawyers that
if they put their credibility at risk, it can have adverse consequences
for their effectiveness as representatives. In a rare example of the
observable effect of reputation on a court's decision, a district court
used the lawyer's reputation for untrustworthiness as one factor to
consider in imposing sanctions for discovery abuse.29 The appellate
court approved:
Once the district court has recognized a pattern of
misbehavior on an attorney's part, the court would
be blinking [sic] reality in not taking counsel's
proven propensities into account. We rule, therefore,
that a trial court may properly give some
consideration to a lawyer's behavior in previous
cases when determining whether to accept the
attorney's explanation of why he failed to comply
with Rule 26(e) in a current case.3"
Most lawyers are probably aware that if they acquire a bad
reputation, it may have some effect on their credibility before courts,
but it is helpful to have a court expressly observe that it is relying on
the lawyer's reputation as one factor justifying sanctions. However, it
is understandable that judges shy away from referring to vague
allegations about a lawyer's reputation, as trial courts risk reversal by
relying on reasoning that sounds like "I know it when I see it." In the
appropriate case, though, a good judicial spanking may be more
effective than all the professionalism conferences in the world at
educating lawyers about the consequences of unprofessional conduct.
C. Trustworthy Lawyers Can Make Credible Commitments
Lawyers in Chicago and Charleston agree that members of the
community with a good reputation can commit themselves to some
action and opposing counsel will rely on these representations. "Here,
your word is your bond," says a Charleston lawyer, "and if you tell a
fellow lawyer that you're going to do something, nobody feels the
need to put that in writing because you know they will do what they
say."3 Similarly, in the context of civil trial practice in Chicago
municipal courts, "[i]f you say you're going to do something, you do
29. Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 246 (1st Cir. 1992). 1 am grateful
to Angeline Purdy for this cite.
30. Id.
31. Tebo, supra note 7, at 44.
10
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something."32 A lawyer's word is her bond in a literal sense. Because
of the importance of reputation, a lawyer who makes a commitment to
another places a valuable asset-her reputation for
trustworthiness-under the control of a third party.33 If the lawyer
making the commitment breaches the agreement, the third party can
"forfeit" the bond by refusing to rely on future commitments and by
spreading the word of the violation to others in the community.
The alternative to relying on the word of a fellow lawyer is the
cumbersome process of memorializing commitments in writing, with
an eye toward using letters as exhibits in support of a motion for relief,
if the lawyer breaks an agreement. Fair or not, this style of practice is
associated with large firms in big cities, and it is significant that the
Charleston lawyers who extol the values of community and civility in
their city stress that "' [w]e don't have big firms here. ,, 34 In reality, the
problem is not with large law firms, but with one-shot participants in
a legal community. One empirical study of discovery abuse revealed
that lawyers perceived much less of a problem with abusive practices
among "regulars," which are
groups of lawyers (1) who are experienced and
regularly practice in a few closely related substantive
areas of civil litigation, e.g., antitrust and trade
regulation matters; (2) who practice for the most part
in the same city or limited geographic area; (3)
whose work is likely to bring them into contact with
one another more than occasionally; (4) who know
one another or at least one another's firms; and (5)
whose practice "styles" are either similar or well
known and essentially accepted by one another.35
This study shows that it is not large firms per se that create
problems, but difficulties in sharing information about the dispositions
of other lawyers to cooperate or engage in abusive practices.36
32. Cahill, supra note 8, at 30.
33. See generally David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relation-
ships, 104 HARv. L. REV. 375, 392-94 (1990) (discussing the three types of "bonds"
as nonlegal sanctions).
34. Tebo, supra note 7, at 42.
35. Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago
Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 219, 240.
36. An anecdote in support: Lawyers at my large firm who worked in smaller,
specialized practices like bankruptcy and maritime law reported few problems with
opponents' abusive practices. The subcommunities werej ust too small for being ajerk
to be a viable strategy in the long-term. By contrast, the commercial litigation and
11
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D. Relationships Matter
Emphasizing the importance of particular relationships seems to
fly in the face of rule of law values such as impartiality and neutrality.
However, in some cases, concern for the health of ongoing human
relationships may motivate a person to act with greater care for the
interests of others. A lawyer in Chicago cultivates good working
relationships with practically everyone in the courthouse, including
clerks and sheriffs deputies.37 In Charleston, "relationships trump
technicalities."3 These statements do not show that these communities
are rife with nepotism; rather, the point is that lawyers establish good
working relationships over time, proving themselves to be trustworthy,
and that these relationships based on trust are more important in the
long-run than formal legal rules. This is certainly not a new insight;
Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil have been making the same point
for years about the relative importance of relationships and the law of
contracts in commercial transactions.3 9 But it is a useful corrective to
the reflexive, often unexamined, assumption that the best remedy for
perceived unethical conduct by lawyers is to emphasize the
technicalities, not the relationships.
The maxim, expressed by the lawyers in Charleston, that
relationships trump technicalities is reminiscent of some work in
feminist ethics, which places relationships at the center of ethical
responsibilities, in contrast to traditional ethical theories that prioritize
abstract concepts such as rights and utility. Several scholars have
urged lawyers to pay more attention to the ethic of care, as this style
of reasoning has been called.4° Putting aside the debate over whether
product liability lawyers, who seldom faced the same adversary in multiple cases,
reported much more unprofessional behavior by adversaries (and may have committed
some themselves!).
37. Cahill, supra note 8, at 32.
38. Tebo, supra note 7, at 44.
39. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Prelimi-
nary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963), Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts
Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa
Bernstein, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 775 (2000).
40. See generally RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PRO-
FESSIONAL DECISIONS (1989) (discussing the natural feminine tendancy to focus on the
ethic of care); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2665 (1993) (discussing how the ethic of care might alter the contours of lawyers'
ethical responsibilities); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of
Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992) (discussing that
the ethic of care helps create meaningful relationships with clients and collegues that
are "rewarding and sustaining"); Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1994) (describing women as male attentive to values ofcare,
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care-based reasoning is more strongly associated with women than
with men, or whether emphasizing care essentializes women with
reference to the supposedly constitutive quality of nurturing, we can
recognize it at least as a complementary style of reasoning that lawyers
can use in ethical deliberation. And to the extent that preserving
relationships is a concern of ethics, small professional communities
seem well-suited to facilitating this goal. It must be said that an
excessive concem with relationships can be an ethical failing as well.
For example, a lawyer who is so worried about damaging her working
relationships with other lawyers and judges may be an insufficiently
committed advocate for an unpopular client. This Article will have
more to say about this concern in the concluding section.
E. Nonlegal Sanctions Can Reach Behavior That Would Be
Difficult to Regulate Using Legal Sanctions
A familiar complaint is that "unprofessional" lawyers engage in
abusive practices that are not a violation of a state bar disciplinary rule
or a rule of court. Perhaps these practices could never be made the
occasion for discipline because of the difficulty in specifying the
conduct that would trigger sanctions, or the difficulty of proving a
violation to a third-party decisionmaker. Consider the following
standards from a "Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism" adopted by the
American Bar Association Section of Tort and Insurance Practice:
" "In litigation proceedings I will agree to
reasonable requests for extensions of time or for
waiver of procedural formalities [e.g. service]
when the legitimate interests of my client will
not be adversely affected." Standard B(3).
* "I will refrain from engaging in excessive and
abusive discovery, and I will comply with all
reasonable discovery requests." Standard B(6).
" "In depositions and other proceedings, and in
negotiations, I will conduct myself with dignity,
avoid making groundless objections and refrain
from engaging in acts of rudeness and
disrespect." Standard B(8).
connection, and context); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at
Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, in LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL PRACTICE:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 25 (Stephen Parker & Charles Sampford eds., 1995)
(discussing the female ethic of care which focuses on people and the substance of
problems).
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" "I will not serve motions and pleadings on the
other party, or his counsel, at such a time or in
such a manner as will unfairly limit the other
party's opportunity to respond." Standard B(9).
" "In civil matters, I will stipulate to facts as to which there
is no genuine dispute." Standard C(9).4
In each of these cases, it would be expensive and time-consuming
to establish a violation in a formal legal proceeding. In economic
terms, the violation of one of these standards is not verifiable, in the
sense that from an ex ante perspective reasonable parties would find
it not worthwhile to try to prove the violation to a third party in the
event of a dispute.42 There are good, due-process related reasons why
a judge may not be able to impose sanctions on the basis of a
perception that discovery requests are "abusive" or the refusal to
stipulate to facts that are not "genuinely" in dispute. At the very least,
it would be expensive and time-consuming for the judge to review the
record leading up to the dispute and issue an order that was justified
in principled terms. For this reason, many judges simply refuse to
intervene in discovery fights or rule on motions for sanctions based on
anything but the most egregious misconduct.43 Although they may not
be able to prove it to a third party decision-maker, the parties in an
ongoing professional relationship would know when another party is
engaging in gratuitous rudeness in a deposition, serving abusive
discovery requests, or refusing to stipulate to facts about which there
is no reasonable dispute. Thus, they may be able to respond to this
kind of misbehavior using nonlegal sanctions, such as withholding
future cooperation and refusing to be flexible in future scheduling. In
this way, nonlegal sanctions fill a void left by the inability of legal
authorities to respond to certain kinds of misconduct and thereby
enhance deterrence of unprofessional behavior by lawyers."
41. A.B.A. Section of Tort and Ins. Practice, Lawyer's Creed on Professionalism
(Annual Meeting 1988), reprinted in A.B.A. COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 366-68 (2001) (emphasis added).
42. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1760
(2001).
43. See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84
MINN. L. REV. 505, 561-65 (2000).
44. The Georgia Chief Justice's Commission recommends "the informal use of
peer influence to alter unprofessional conduct," particularly with regard to breaches of
professional norms that would be difficult to enforce through formal means, such as
showing "inappropriate respect ordeference," engaging in abusive discovery practices,
and exhibiting incivility or bias. GA. COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 39-40.
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III. SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT NONLEGAL SANCTIONS
It is important to end this brief Essay with some cautionary notes.
Informal, community-based, reputation-driven sanctions are not a
panacea. In fact, there are some structural problems with relying too
heavily on nonlegal regulation. For one thing, communities exist only
by drawing boundaries separating insiders and outsiders, and there is
a serious risk that the community's norms, which are enforced by
nonlegal sanctions, might be biased in favor of insiders.45 In a
homogeneous community, such as the elite tier of corporate
practitioners in a larger market, it may be appropriate to speak of
shared values, networks of relationships, free sharing of information,
and other preconditions to flourishing regimes of nonlegal regulation.
However, these shared values might not be the values we should
cultivate among lawyers. As historian Jerold Auerbach and others
have observed, bar leaders have often been virulently anti-immigrant,
calling for professional reforms that were transparently designed to
keep bar membership confined to the WASP elite. 6 Words like
"morally unfit" were used as code words for "foreign born,"47 and the
overriding concern of the bar was to keep out immigrant lawyers who
espoused the "wrong" values, such as socialism. Similarly, the bar
decried "ambulance chasing" by lawyers who sought to challenge the
structural immunity enjoyed by industrial corporations, particularly
railroads, from liability for accidental injuries or deaths among
workers.48 Significantly, the attack on plaintiffs' lawyers was couched
in terms of moral character and the undesirability of diversifying the
community of lawyers who, presumably, were all of the same mind
about liability for workplace injuries. And, of course, much of the elite
bar was notoriously apathetic to the problems of segregation, racism,
and racial inequality.49 I am not claiming that communities always
cultivate pernicious values and invidious insider-outsider distinctions,
but it is certainly possible that a community's values are ones that
ought to be rooted out, not celebrated.
To put the point another way, sometimes vindicating justice
requires a disruption in the existing patterns of relationships.5" The
45. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 42-44 (1976).
46. Id. at 52, 119-24, 130-33.
47. Id. at 123.
48. Id. at 48-51.
49. Id. at 263-67.
50. See Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Needfor Rights,
11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 625 (1988).
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ABA Journal article on Charleston quotes an African-American lawyer
who observes that "white and black lawyers make efforts to reach out
to one another,"'" suggesting the reporter's sensitivity to the obvious
criticism of relying on community values in a Southern city. One could
imagine that black lawyers would not have been welcomed with open
arms by the white establishment," just as the native-born population
of lawyers in the 1920s fought mightily to keep out immigrants from
Central and Southern Europe. The civil rights movement was a
profoundly destabilizing period in history when patterns of social and
commercial relationships were upset by the struggle for equality.
Lawyers who were unduly concerned with maintaining good
relationships with others in the same geographic community would not
have been as effective as those who were willing to challenge the
existing structures of hierarchy and exclusion. Again, this is not to say
that professional communities cannot form across racial and ethnic
lines, but the history of the professionalism movement related by
Auerbach should inspire some caution about over-relying on
community-based regulation.53
The comment by the Charleston lawyer that "relationships trump
technicalities" is encouraging, as long as "technicalities" are
understood to mean the sorts of procedural maneuvering that lawyers
use unfairly to bog down cases. However, it is well to keep in mind
that one person's loophole may be another's constitutional right. One
persistent theme of the public's criticism of lawyers, particularly those
who represent criminal defendants, is that they get their clients off on
technicalities. If the technicality in question is the right against self-
incrimination or the right to be free from unlawful searches and
seizures, the lawyer in question would actually be acting to vindicate
a fundamental liberty interest of the client. This is a familiar debate,
but from time to time powerful lawyers tend to forget about the
constitutional significance of the technicalities employed by lawyers.
In 1946, Attorney General Tom Clark gave an address denouncing
"revolutionary" lawyers who "use[] every device in the legal category
to further the interests of those who would destroy our government."54
He suggested that the organized bar take these lawyers to the
51. Tebo, supra note 7, at 44.
52. In Charleston in the 1940s, in fact, the professional and social community
ostracized a federal judge who had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in a civil rights case.
Thej udge had formerly been a member of the city's social elite. See RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 366 (1975).
53. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 45 (providing the history of the profes-
sionalism evolution).
54. Id. at 233.
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woodshed for "a definite and well-deserved admonition,"55 but given
the anti-Communist hysteria of the time, it is a fair assumption that the
unorganized bar-the professional communities in which these
lawyers practiced-would have already done some "woodshedding"
of their own.
On a smaller scale, just as there are structural problems inherent
in legal regulation, there are structural problems inherent in nonlegal
regulation. A well known analysis of one of these problems is
sociologist Abraham Blumberg's provocatively titled article about
criminal defense lawyers, The Practice ofLaw as Confidence Game. 6
Blumberg's insight is that repeat-player defense lawyers, who deal
regularly with prosecutors, judges, and courthouse personnel, owe
divided loyalties-first to the other repeat-players with whom they
interact on a repeat basis and only secondarily to their clients.57 There
are many cases in which a lawyer could take some action that would
be beneficial to the client, such as insisting on going to trial instead of
accepting a plea bargain, but which would anger one of the other
repeat-players. For example, judges depend on plea bargains to keep
their dockets manageable and may regard defense lawyers who insist
on trials as obstructionist. The dilemma for the defense lawyer is that
if she does not maintain good working relationships with other
courthouse regulars, she will not be as effective in the future on behalf
of other clients. So the lawyer faces the prospect of "selling out" the
present client to further the interests of an undefined set of future
clients. The dilemma only arises because of the possibility of informal
sanctions against the defense lawyer-prosecutors being
uncooperative in the future, judges giving short shrift to requests for
relief, and so on. Then, in some ways, the concern for reputation that
arises natbrally in small communities ofpractitioners may lead lawyers
to be less effective as they could be on behalf of particular clients,
although it is arguable that they are more effective in the long term.58
I will conclude, as I have before, with the modest argument that
legal and nonlegal sanctions are complementary methods of enhancing
the accountability of lawyers, not exclusive means of regulation.
Nonlegal sanctions are particularly effective where a violation of a
norm would be costly to prove to a third-party decisionmaker-as in
55. Id.
56. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organi-
zational Cooptation of a Profession, I LAW & SOC'Y REV. 15 (1967).
57. Id. at 20; see also Galanter, supra note 6, at 117-18.
58. See generally DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF
CONTEXT ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1990) (providing a detailed look at how law
is practiced in a rural setting).
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cases where the judgment of a violation is a highly contextual, fact-
specific one, or depends on impressionistic information. In industries
with flourishing regimes of nonlegal regulation, such as the diamond
and cotton trade associations described by Lisa Bernstein,59 there are
numerous judgments that must be made about a party's good faith in
dealing judged against a backdrop of highly volatile markets and
subjective evaluations of the quality of the goods being traded. Many
instances of litigation misconduct are similar to breaches of norms of
good faith dealing in the cotton or diamond industries, because
describing them as "misconduct" requires an assessment of the actor's
motivation, past behavior, and any possible legitimate reasons for the
action in the context of a detailed record. Lawyers recognize the
difficulty in specifying grounds for their judgments that others have
engaged in misconduct. As one of the reporters of an ABA study on
discovery abuse wrote: "The answer to almost every question [about
discovery practices] is 'it depends.' Aggressiveness generally is
inappropriate, unless the war was initiated by the other side. Hardball
is inappropriate unless there is a specter of mischievous plaintiffs'
lawyers waiting to use the information from discovery in other suits."6
The significant thing about this comment is not that lawyers cannot
recognize discovery abuse when they see it, but that they cannot
establish it, under generally applicable criteria specified in advance.
In such a case, we might expect unprofessional behavior to go
unchecked in the absence of some kind of nonlegal sanctions for
misconduct. However, if the ABA Journal articles on Chicago and
Charleston establish anything,6' it is that some professional
communities get by pretty well without the kinds of abusive practices
that are the basis for professionalism horror stories told at conferences
like this one.
As Deborah Rhode has frequently observed, the professionalism
movement is hampered by a lack of empirical support for the claims
that there is a problem and that there is an effective way to do
something about it.62 I am not claiming that a few anecdotes about
harmonious communities of lawyers provide decisive evidence in
favor of letting communities regulate themselves.63 But they do, at
59. See Bernstein, supra note 42 (discussing the cotton industry); Bernstein, su-
pra note 20 (discussing the diamond industry).
60. Nelson, supra note 19, at 780.
61. Tebo, supra note 7; Cahill, supra note 8.
62. Deborah L. Rhode, Defining the Challenges of Professionalism: Access to
Law and Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L. REV. 889 (2003).
63. There are apparently many more anecdotes. Here is a statement from the National
Conference of Bar President's Professional Reform Initiative: "It does appear that in areas
where the bar and judiciary are smaller and where lawyers and judges tend to know each other,
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least, suggest ways in which the response to the perceived crisis in
professionalism, and the need for enhanced accountability for lawyers
is not necessarily a role only for judges, bar grievance personnel, rules
committees, legislatures, and other legal authorities. Under certain
conditions, if there is a problem with unprofessional conduct, lawyers
themselves might not do a bad job redressing it.
problems related to honesty and truthfulness are not so frequently experienced as in areas which
have thousands of lawyers and hundreds of judges." Professional Reform Initiative,
Introduction, The Professional Reform Initative's First Project: Increasing Public Trust and
Confidence in the Justice System by Emphasizing Truthfulness and Honesty as the Lawyers'
Stock-in-Trade, available at http://www.cobar.org/DOCS/PRI%2Project.pdf (last visited Feb.
15, 2003).
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